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The Phantom Revolution. The Presidential and Parliamentary  elections of 
2017  
 
The results of both the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2017 in 
France grabbed the headlines around the world. In the April-May presidential 
elections, 39 year-old and previously unelected Emmanuel Macron swept to 
power, supported by a party that was only one year old and that claimed to be 
‘above left and right’. He put together a government made up of individuals from 
both centre-right and centre-left, alongside non-party members, with a Prime 
Minister from the centre-right Les Républicains. Macron immediately began 
implementing change, by decree, including relaxation of labour laws and 
measures to combat corruption in politics. For the first time under the Fifth 
Republic, neither of the two presidential candidates for the established parties of 
government - the Parti socialiste and Les Républicains – had gone through to the 
second round, instead of which there was a run-off between Macron and Marine 
Le Pen for the extreme right Front national. In the parliamentary elections in 
June, Macron’s party emerged with an absolute majority of seats in parliament 
(308 out of a total 577), with députés who had in many cases been members of 
the traditional parties of centre left or centre right, or who previously had no 
party affiliation. The Les Républicains party emerged from the elections severely 
weakened, not only in electoral terms but also because of significant figures 
leaving its ranks to join forces with Macron. The Parti Socialiste, meanwhile, was 
in tatters, with its future survival by no means guaranteed. On the face of it, this 
was a substantial victory for a new type of politics, where people previously 
from the left, the right or with no former political allegiance pulled together for 
the sake of ‘modernising’ France, of tackling unemployment and allowing 
France’s economy and reputation to thrive in both Europe and beyond. At first 
glance, then, Macron was on course to achieve the Révolution described in the 
book he published during the campaign (Macron 2016).  
 On closer inspection, however, we see that politics according to Macron 
and his new party are remarkably similar to the – often converging – 
programmes of centre left or centre right over the past few decades, particularly 
as far as economic policy is concerned, which is increasingly neo-liberal. The 
Macron era will very likely not, in fact, be a radical departure from what France 
has known for many years, but continuation in a slightly different guise. 
Moreover, in order to understand the significance of the 2017 elections, we also 
need to consider the fact that many people voted for neither Macron nor for the 
other candidates of the conventional centre parties, a result which reflects 
severe discontent with mainstream politics of the past few decades, often on the 
part of people who have been badly affected materially by the similar policies of 
successive governments. This explains in part why the extreme right Marine Le 
Pen came a strong second in round one of the presidential elections and why the 
scenario of her winning the second round was a possible one, even if unlikely. 
Next, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, supported by the left-of-centre La France Insoumise, 
also attracted nearly one fifth of all votes cast in the first round of the 
presidential elections. Together with very minor candidates, then, nearly 18 
million (if we included Hamon’s support) out of a total of 37 million votes were 
cast in favour of candidates who were anti-mainstream, often with very different 
programmes from each other but nevertheless all deeply opposed to the centre 
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politics of the past thirty or so years. Finally, the number of both abstentions and 
– perhaps most importantly – of spoiled ballots was at a record high in both 
presidential and parliamentary elections, and significantly higher than five years 
previously. Again, this suggests disillusionment with governmental politics in 
recent times.  
   
Macron: President for the status quo 
 
The dynamic underlying the election of Macron and the success of La République 
en Marche (REM) – as the party became after the presidential elections - is not, 
then, part of a radical new departure in French politics, but is the logical next 
step along the path of increasingly managerial government that is now so 
familiar to people living in advanced capitalist countries. Since the U-turn of 
1982-83, when President Mitterrand and his Socialist government changed 
direction dramatically, abandoning their neo-Keynesian reform programme in 
favour of austerity and wage restraint and for greater emphasis on private 
enterprise, the strongest trend in the way France has been governed has been 
one of increasing similarity between parties of the centre-left and parties of the 
centre-right, united especially in an increasingly economically-neoliberal 
direction of travel.  
Since the mid-1980s, the Parti socialiste (PS) and centre-right have been 
sufficiently close in terms of programme to allow cohabitation between 
Presidents of one complexion and governments of the other (in 1986-88, 1993-
95 and 1997-2002), an arrangement that was unthinkable between the 
beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and the mid-1980s, when the Communist 
Party was strong and the Socialist current either weak or in alliance or quasi-
alliance with the Communists, but since the mid-1980s perfectly acceptable to 
most mainstream politicians and many voters. There has also been repeated 
presidential alternance between PS and centre-right, with Socialist presidents 
elected in 1981, 1988 and 2012, and centre-right presidents elected in 1995, 
2002 and 2007. With the election of Macron comes the – at least notional - actual 
merging of centre-left and centre-right in the same president, the same party and 
the same government, which might be seen as the most natural of developments, 
given that, especially in terms of economic policy, PS and centre-right have acted 
in similar ways. Although Sarkozy’s presidency (2007-2012) took the form of a 
more aggressive, Bonapartist approach to economics, ‘law and order’ and 
immigration (the latter two issues were indeed seen as intimately connected), 
wanting the centre right to become a droite décomplexée which would attract FN 
sympathisers (Hewlett 2011), generally speaking the Socialists and the centre-
right were pursuing similar agendas of neo-liberal economic change and little 
criticism of the European Union, which has become increasingly demanding.  
Against a background of ardent support for the European Union - 
confirmed by a close relationship with Angela Merkel, herself head of a Grand 
Coalition between her own Christian Democratic party and the centre-left Social 
Democratic Party - Macron’s economic policy is resolutely in favour of private 
enterprise, the free market and a more ‘flexible’ labour market. In his manifesto 
he sought further deregulation of conditions of employment and various other 
pro-business measures, including a more relaxed approach to the 35-hour week, 
tax cuts (especially for business, from 33 to 25 per cent of profits), 60 billion 
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euros of cuts in public expenditure over five years and drastic reduction of the 
size of the public sector, meaning the abolition of 120,000 civil servants’ posts. 
Both the employers’ organization Medef and the French financial press, not to 
mention the Financial Times, reacted favourably to the government’s first weeks 
in office, but the left-leaning  Observatoire française des conjonctures 
économiques (OFCE) predicted that the measures taken by the government were 
likely to be ‘extremely favourable to the wealthiest households’ and were in 
danger of  deepening inequality between rich and poor (Charrel 2017). When the 
Financial Times interviewed Prime Minister Edouard Philippe during the July 
honeymoon period, the newspaper reported that according to Philippe 
‘”Macronism” is the direct legacy of Alain Juppé’, and: 
 ‘[w]hen it is suggested that the government’s plans for a flexible labour 
market, tax cuts for business and public spending curbs were all rightwing 
measures, Mr Philippe bursts into laughter. “Yes, what did you expect?”, he says’. 
(Chassany and Stothard 2017)   
Socially, Macron’s policies are decidedly more progressive in orientation, 
with a relatively liberal attitude towards immigration, in particular with regards 
refugees from the Middle East and Africa, an approach influenced in part by 
Merkel, and he argues that immigration can have a positive effect on the 
economy. Regarding the state of emergency imposed following terrorist attacks, 
he believes it should end, but adds that some measures should be incorporated 
into French law. On the environment there are various ambitious proposals, 
including reduction of France’s dependence on nuclear energy for generating 
electricity to 50 per cent by the year 2025 and the development of renewable 
energy. He believes prison reform is necessary, including better conditions for 
many prisoners. In order to achieve greater equality between men and women, 
Macron is in favour of several new measures, including penalties for companies 
and political parties that are not making efforts in this direction and increased 
protection for women who are victims of violence or harassment. Many have 
suggested that ‘Macronism’ is reminiscent of Blairism, in that both are 
economically neo-liberal, socially liberal, very pro-European Union, and one 
could add that both currents are or were characterised by youthful and 
charismatic leadership. Tony Blair’s Third Way of the late 1990s and early years 
of the twenty-first century (Giddens 1998) has now, it seems, arrived in France.  
In party political terms, early-stage Macronism is an amalgam of the right 
of the PS and the liberal wing of Les Républicains (LR), with some non-aligned 
specialists lending a hand as well. The government formed by Macron after his 
election was led by Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, a close ally of Alain Juppé 
(on the ‘softer’ side of LR), and included notably, from LR: Bruno Le Maire as 
Economics Minister (formerly agriculture minister and Secretary of State for 
Europe under Sarkozy); and Gérard Darmanin as Minister for Public Action and 
Accounts (also a former Sarkozy supporter). From the Socialists there was: Jean-
Yves Le Drian as Foreign Minister (Defense Minister in the last government 
under Hollande); the veteran Mayor of Lyon Gérard Collomb as Minister of the 
Interior; and locally-elected PS member Nicole Belloubet as Minister for Justice 
(an academic and civil servant). ‘Non-aligned’ ministers included: the Minister 
for Labour, Murielle Pénicaud (previously director of Business France); the 
Minister for Health, Agnès Buzyn (a high-profile doctor); and the new 
environment minister, environmental activist and former television personality 
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Nicolas Hulot, who had refused roles in both Sarkozy and Hollande governments. 
There were initially four ministers from the centre-right MoDem party, including 
its leader François Bayrou, who supports Macron closely, but they resigned 
within 48 hours of their appointment, after allegations of financial impropriety 
in relation to the party.  
Macron’s personal style and character are perhaps more compatible with 
presidential office than Hollande’s, and certainly a great deal more so than 
Sarkozy’s. But Macron is in many ways out of the same mould as countless other 
career politicians and has had a highly conventional career to date, although he 
has reached the top far faster than most. He is a graduate of the elite grandes 
écoles Sciences Po and École national d’administration, he worked both as a 
senior civil servant (an Inspecteur des Finances) and as an investment banker at 
Rothschilds, before becoming Hollande’s economic policy advisor and protégé, 
and then economics minister in Manuel Valls’ government in 2014. In the 
summer of 2016, he resigned his ministerial post and declared that he would run 
for president with the support of a new movement bearing his own initials.  
 Macron thus in multiple ways represents continuity and even the simple 
arithmetic of the presidential election results suggests that many people already 
recognize and dislike this about him. He attracted only 24.0 per cent of the vote 
in the first round of the presidential elections, and was within a few percentage 
points of the following three candidates. There is also the context of massive 
numbers of spoiled ballots, whose proportion was multiplied by four from one 
round to the other and at 11.5 per cent in the second round was almost double 
the previous record for spoiled ballots, namely 6.4 per cent in 1969. As 
Braconnier and Dormagen (2017) argue, almost all spoiled ballots are protest 
votes, rather than a reflection of accidental damage of ballot papers.  
Abstentions, meanwhile, were very high. (See Table 3.) This would seem to 
indicate that, despite a significant majority in parliament for REM, Macron’s 
period as president and his attempts to ‘transform’ France – as he has repeatedly 
promised - will be far from plain sailing. 
 
Table 1. The French Presidential elections of 23 April and 7 May 2017. 
Table 2. The French Parliamentary elections of 11 June and 18 June 2017. 
Table 3. Abstentions and spoiled ballots (blancs et nuls) since 1958. 
COPY TO FOLLOW  
 
Fillon and Les Républicains: defeat snatched from the jaws of victory  
 
The process by which Macron went from being am almost unknown politician 
with no elected position to being President of the Republic in the space of a few 
years is certainly remarkable. But it should not be forgotten that there was a 
large element of luck involved in this rise to the ultimate position of political 
power, coming mainly in the form of his principal opponent’s labefaction at the 
hands of a satirical newspaper.  
In the months running up to the publication of the first of a series of 
articles in Le Canard enchaîné on 25 January 2017 regarding the alleged 
embezzlement of public funds by François Fillon, opinion polls were giving the 
LR candidate a clear lead, suggesting that in the second round he would face Le 
Pen and would beat her with ease (Martin 2017, 252). Fillon was the most right-
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wing choice as candidate for LR, with firmly neo-liberal positions on the 
economy, including tax cuts, reduction of employer contributions to social 
security and weakening the role of trade unions in the workplace. These were 
combined with ultra-conservative social positions informed by staunch Catholic 
values; widely-viewed as being anti-LGBT, he was committed to outlawing 
medically assisted procreation, banning donor insemination for single women 
and same sex couples, and he would have repealed legislation on the rights of 
same-sex couples and individuals to adopt. Similar to Sarkozy in the two 
previous presidential campaigns, Fillon’s positions on immigration and law and 
order were designed in part to attract voters who were tempted to vote FN, and 
included the establishment of annual quotas on immigration, making it more 
difficult for foreigners to obtain French nationality, creating 16,000 more prison 
places, and bringing the age of criminal responsibility down to 16. As his 
campaign progressed, he appeared to move even further to the right, with 
greater emphasis on patriotism, promotion of the nuclear family as the only 
legitimate personal arrangement, declarations against ‘radical Islam’ and against 
liberal attitudes on immigration.  
 Until the Canard published its revelations, it seemed very likely that Fillon 
would not only become president, but that LR would win a clear majority in 
parliament and thus the now common cycle of PS and centre-right alternance 
would continue, at least for the time being. But the extent and the apparently 
well-founded nature of the allegations against Fillon put paid to that particular 
outcome, with the ostensibly staunch believer in moral rectitude and hard work 
apparently guilty of paying hundreds of thousands of euros of public funds to his 
wife Penelope for parliamentary assistance she had not carried out, of paying his 
sons for ‘legal advice’ before they were qualified lawyers, and of accepting gifts 
of very expensive suits and watches. He also reportedly persuaded a rich friend 
to pay Penelope for a job on a literary magazine that she did no work for and a 
Lebanese businessman paid him $50,000 in return for being introduced to 
Vladimir Putin.    
The seemingly well-founded revelations of Penelopegate and related 
scandals came at such a point in the electoral cycle as to make finding another 
willing and viable candidate almost impossible, even if Fillon had been prepared 
to stand down (which he was not), and the softer-right former presidential 
hopeful Alain Juppé made it clear that he was no longer prepared to put himself 
forward, having been previously passed by in favour of Fillon. When it was 
announced that Fillon had come third in the first round of the elections, he made 
it clear that he would vote Macron in the second round, although almost a third 
of his voters went on to vote Le Pen (Courtois 2017).  
 In the parliamentary elections, Les Républicains went from having 188 
seats (as UMP) during the Hollande presidency to having 112. This was far from 
a complete wipe out, but the calamitous Fillon candidacy, combined with 
multiple high-profile defections from LR to the Macron camp after the 
presidential elections (including by the Prime Minister) heralded much potential 
trouble and divisions within the centre-right.  
 
The Parti socialiste: terminal decline? 
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The Parti socialiste, from whose stable Macron bolted so recently, had a 
disastrous presidential term under François Hollande and paid the price heavily 
in both presidential and parliamentary elections. Hollande began his term in 
office with left-leaning pledges, which were to pursue state-stimulated growth 
and progressive taxation: most eye-catchingly, there would be 75 per cent tax on 
incomes over one million euros per year; tax breaks for wealthy individuals 
would be capped at 10,000 euros; and bigger companies would pay a 
substantially higher rate of tax than smaller ones. This would all be combined 
with ceilings on certain high salaries in the public sector, job creation in both 
education and the private sector, and lowering the age of retirement. For the first 
time in history, in 2012 the PS had majorities in both the National Assembly and 
the Senate, and excellent distribution of electoral support across France and in 
many major cities.  
But the left-inspired approach to the economy and labour relations 
quickly turned to dust and Hollande’s presidency became the embodiment of la 
pensée unique as far as economic policy and the erosion of labour rights were 
concerned. There were various deeply unpopular bills, including what became 
the Loi El Khomri which revised the Code du Travail and eroded worker rights 
on lay offs, severance payments and overtime payments, and the Loi…Macron, 
which loosened Sunday trading rules, sold state shareholdings and introduced 
competition with the state rail network from coach companies. These proposed 
changes prompted intense strike activity, together with street demonstrations 
and other protests, including the innovative Nuit Debout, which became a feeder 
movement for La France Insoumise and helped build support for Mélenchon.  
Certainly, there were various progressive measures taken during 
Hollande’s presidency, including new legislation to allow same-sex couples to 
marry and jointly adopt children, known as mariage pour tous, which was 
strongly opposed both within and outside parliament, and which became law in 
Spring 2013. But the predominant tenor of the Hollande presidency, along with 
often unpopular responses to terrorist attacks, including the State of Emergency, 
was a concerted attempt to ‘modernise’ the French economy, in large part along 
neoliberal – and certainly highly ‘pro-employer’ – lines. In addition to the 
measures mentioned above, there were various business-oriented  pactes 
(compétivité, responsabilité, stabilité, and so on), sometimes justified by 
reference to the exigencies of the EU, whose economic requirements the PS itself 
had played an important role in shaping. With such an agenda, Hollande’s 
governments quickly lost support from the left of the party and from the Greens, 
not to mention from a large part of the natural PS electorate. Amable and 
Palombarini (2016, 132-2; also Anderson 2017) argue that this biting the hand 
that votes PS has been a severe electoral handicap several times over; the party 
does not stick to election manifesto pledges and governs directly against the 
grain of the natural wishes of the popular electorate, despite the fact that the PS 
cannot afford to alienate these voters if it wants to be re-elected. The stinging 
defeats in the wake of PS governmental terms in 1986, 1993, 2002 and now 
2017 reflect this feeling of betrayal on the part of many working class voters.   
 Once Hollande had conceded – in an all-time first for a President of the 
Fifth Republic - that he was unre-electable, the response by the grass roots was 
to select the distinctly left-leaning Benoît Hamon as the PS candidate, who beat 
right-wing Manuel Valls in the selection process final round by almost 20 
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percentage points, in a result that was reminiscent of the selection of Jeremy 
Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party in Britain. Hamon represented a clear break 
with the Hollande-Valls period in particular, having resigned his post as Minister 
for Education in 2014 in order to oppose the majority government position. 
Hamon’s presidential programme included a universal basic income, a 
commitment to tax companies less if they were reinvesting profits, temporary 
nationalization of companies where they were failing, and tax on robots because 
they will increasingly take jobs away from workers, with the robot tax being 
used to retrain workers displaced by automation. He was highly critical not only 
of the recent PS governments’ economic policy, but also of the Valls 
government’s attitude towards matters of immigration and law and order, which 
he viewed as being little different from that of the right.  
As a result of the perceived betrayals, the deep divisions and the 
defections in the party, the PS had the worst election results since its inception in 
1971; Hamon polled only 6.4 per cent of votes in the first round of the 
presidential elections, after which he called for a vote for Macron against Le Pen. 
In the parliamentary elections, the PS received 7.4 per cent in the first round and 
5.7 per cent in the second, and had only 30 députés in the new parliament, 
compared with 278 in the previous one and 186 in the one before. As a candidate 
himself in the parliamentary elections, Hamon did not achieve the 12.5 per cent 
needed in the first round to go through to the second.  
  Adding to an already – to say the least – uphill battle facing Hamon in the 
presidential campaign, leading figures in the PS had already publically 
disavowed him and instead supported Macron well before the first round. These 
included Manuel Vals, the former Prime Minister (2014-16, having been Minister 
for the Interior, 2012-14). Valls was keen to stand in the parliamentary elections 
as a REM candidate, but was refused membership of the party; it was eventually 
agreed that no REM candidate would be fielded against him in his constituency in 
Essonne, where he eventually won with a tiny (and contested) margin against La 
France Insoumise candidate Farida Amrani. Valls, a natural Macron ally, now 
supports REM in parliament and is likely to be in government again before long, 
alongside other PS defectors. 
The PS is of course now even more deeply divided than it was before 
Spring 2017. The left of the party argues that if the PS had been more united 
behind Hamon, it might at least have been able to fair somewhat better against 
both Macron and Mélenchon, but as it was Hamon was both tainted by 
association with the Hollande presidency and also undermined by leaders of his 
own party. The right of the PS, meanwhile, argues that Hamon’s criticism of the 
Hollande presidency over several years was a betrayal and that the manifesto 
was unrealistic. The perhaps more natural alliance been between Hamon and 
Mélenchon, whose combined votes amounted to more than Macron’s, did not 
happen. In the mean time, Hamon has left the PS in order to set up a grass roots 
organisation to assess the future of socialst politics in France and beyond. It 
seems that the centre-left is becoming as fissiparous as it was in the Fourth 
Republic.  
 
Le Pen and the FN: forward march of the extreme right unhalted 
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In many advanced capitalist countries, parties or movements expressing 
opposition to the centre-oriented, highly elite-led and business-oriented 
mainstream parties have enjoyed sometimes unforeseen success. These were 
variously parties or movements of the extreme right (including in Austria, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Finland), sometimes of the alternative (that is non-
mainstream) left, as in Greece, Spain and (to some extent) in the British Labour 
Party under Corbyn. Some of these developments were difficult to classify in 
conventional terms, in particular the Brexit movement in Britain and the 
campaign which brought Donald Trump to power in the USA, which were 
arguably in both cases dominated and led by the right but which managed to 
harness the anger of many poorer working class voters as well.   
The Front national under Marine Le Pen is arguably part of this revolt 
against the mainstream which can take so many different forms, and has become 
a very significant party of protest against both the PS and the LR, parties which 
they suggest have been pursuing very similar policies which are in the interests 
neither of the French nation as a whole nor poorer French people. However, 
notwithstanding the attempted process of dédiabolisation under Le Pen junior’s 
leadership, the most prominent feature of the FN’s programme is its anti-
immigration stance, combined with a more general and extreme nationalism. Its 
presidential programme contained a great deal on the questions of law and 
order, terrorism and immigration, preoccupations which were closely associated 
with one another, and argued for the ‘end of uncontrolled immigration’, the 
abolition of the no-passport control Schengen Area and for restricting 
immigration into France to 10,000 per year. ‘Anti-terrorist’ measures included 
the expulsion of any immigrant convicted of terrorist-related offenses. ‘Security’ 
policies, designed to ‘bring order back to France’, included the creation of 40,000 
additional prison places, life imprisonment meaning literally imprisonment until 
death, a referendum on bringing back the death penalty, 15,000 extra police 
officers ,and 50,000 additional soldiers.  
 Another aspect of this ultra-nationalist programme is what is described as 
‘la priorité nationale’ as far as housing, social security payments and 
employment are concerned, allowing only French nationals access to state-
owned housing and benefits, and offering a competitive advantage to French 
companies, and higher taxes for companies employing non-French nationals. The 
FN also supports secularism against the supposed ‘Islamicisation’ of French 
society, the re-introduction of school uniform, a more traditional school 
curriculum, and the abolition of the right of same-sex couples to marry.  
 The FN’s economic policies are a bizarre – and no doubt entirely 
unworkable - mix of neo-liberal and state interventionist, pro-worker, measures, 
designed to appeal variously to the world of business and a working class 
electorate deeply disillusioned with the centre parties.  Thus, measures to cut 
‘red tape’, reduce employer contributions in small and medium-sized businesses 
and a commitment not to increase the minimum wage, sit alongside promises to 
overturn the Loi El Komri, give increases to the lowest paid, maintain the 35-
hour week and bring the retirement age back down to 60.  
 Highly critical of the European Union, the FN argues that it is both a 
vehicle for bringing unwanted foreigners into France and that it allows 
competition from other EU states to have a deleterious effect on some companies 
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in France. Le Pen promised a referendum on both withdrawal from the EU and 
from the euro, without taking a consistent stance on either issue herself.  
 In addition to being a party that infuses much of its programme with 
hostility towards immigration and in favour of law and order and ‘traditional 
values’, the FN’s ambition has been to become the number one party of protest 
against the mainstream. This has indeed come true, and Marine Le Pen’s going 
through to the second round of the presidential elections with only one million 
fewer votes than Macron in the first round is ultimate proof of this. Le Pen was 
particularly aggressive towards Macron in the debate between the two rounds 
and no doubt lost support as a result, but she nevertheless polled 34 per cent in 
the second round, which was almost exactly double the proportion of votes 
received by her father Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002.  
 In the parliamentary elections, the FN did less well – no doubt in part 
because of the ‘presidentialist logic’ of the national election cycle in France, 
where the parliamentary elections tend to confirm the presidential elections, but 
also because part of the success of the FN has been the figure of Le Pen herself, as 
with her father before her, which works to the FN’s advantage in presidential 
elections and far less in parliamentary elections. The nature of the electoral 
system meant that with 8.8 per cent of the vote in the second round the FN 
ended up with only 8 députés (less than two per cent of the total), which may 
well serve to compound the view amongst many voters as well as non-voters 
that the electoral system does not allow fair representation in parliament.  
  
Mélenchon and La France Insoumise: the return of the alternative left?  
 
For the first time since the late 1970s, when the French Communist Party was 
still a force to be reckoned with, the candidate of a party to the left of the PS 
received roughly one in five votes in the presidential elections. This was the 
second time the former PS Minister for Vocational Education (2000-2002) Jean-
Luc Mélenchon ran for president, this time supported by his party La France 
Insoumise. With only the Trotskyists Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud to 
his left, he almost doubled his result from 2012, when he polled 11.1 per cent.  
Mélenchon’s programme set out plans to curtail the power of banks and other 
financial institutions, to stop virtually all redundancies, in part by imposing 
financial penalties on companies seeking to make employees redundant, and 
greatly increase employees’ control over their work environment and allowing 
them to form cooperatives in cases of firm closures. 3.5 million new jobs were 
promised, partly as a result of reductions in the length of the working week from 
35 to 32 hours, and the state would invest in national projects to the tune of 100 
billion euros over five years. The minimum wage would be raised to 1326 euros 
per month. Protectionist measures in relation to France’s economy would both 
save threatened jobs and help reduce unacceptable practices in poorer countries, 
including child labour. Equality between women and men would be promoted in 
part by allowing strictly the same parental leave rights between men and 
women. Perhaps the most radical proposal was for a new constitution and a new 
(Sixth) Republic, which would establish – via referendum - a constituent 
assembly made up equally of women and men, elected via proportional 
representation and disbarring anyone who had been a député under the Fifth 
Republic. Once the Sixth Republic had been established, President Mélenchon 
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would resign, finally allowing what was described as a far more democratic 
system to take over.  
 In terms of foreign policy, France would leave NATO, withdraw from 
dubious alliances with foreign leaders and from wars which derailed the cause of 
international peace. The United Nations would be supported more 
enthusiastically. On Europe, negotiations would take place to make the EU more 
democratic, less neo-liberal and generally more in tune with the interests of 
ordinary citizens; after negotiations had taken place, there would be a 
referendum on whether or not to leave the EU. As far as immigration was 
concerned, emphasis would be placed both on treating immigrants and their 
children with dignity in France and on helping prevent circumstances arising in 
other countries which led to forced migration.  
  In the first round of the presidential elections Mélenchon received 19.6 
per cent of the vote, meaning the discrepancy between the results of Le Pen, 
Fillon and Mélenchon was less than two percentage points, and each candidate 
thus received roughly one fifth of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, La 
France Insoumise received respectively 11.0 and 4.9 per cent of the vote in the 
first and second rounds and only 17 deputes were elected. This still means that 
the party can form a ‘parliamentary group’ and is arguably the principal 
opposition party on the left, at least on a par with the PS, assuming it works in 
parliament with the PCF’s ten députés and taking Mélenchon’s showing in the 
presidential elections into account. This is a significant development and 
potentially a crucial part of a restructuring of French party politics.  
 Various analysts have suggested that the positions of the FN and La 
France Insoumise in the elections were similar and that the FN is no longer 
classically on the extreme right. Certainly, both parties emphasised defending 
the interests of the ordinary working or unemployed person and this is often 
placed in contrast with the actions and interests of more conventional 
politicians. But we have seen how the FN’s programme and politics more 
generally is infused with extreme nationalism and often scapegoating and a 
glance at declared motivations for voting one way or the other in the first round 
of the presidential elections, according to the polling organization IPSOS, show 
that FN voters are clear about this. When asked for the three most important 
reasons for voting FN, 69 per cent chose immigration, 46 per cent terrorism and 
42 per cent law and order (insécurité); when La France Insoumise voters were 
asked the same question, 42 per cent chose social inequality and other primary 
preoccupations varied greatly, but very few saw the FN voters’ first choices as 
priorities (IPSOS 2017).  
 
Conclusions 
 
The phenomenal double victory of Macron and REM in France may seem to fly in 
the face of major political developments in other advanced capitalist countries. 
Elsewhere, what were seen as marginal currents, parties or movements claiming 
to act on behalf of the ordinary person against the ravages of free trade and neo-
liberalism, the irresponsible international banking system and the EU, have 
gathered much support over the past few years. From Syriza in Greece and 
Podemos in Spain, to the Corbyn phenomenon in Britain and even elements of 
the Brexit referendum vote and Trump’s victory in the USA, forces flying in the 
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face of established politics and accepted wisdom in economic policy have been 
disrupting the conventions of government as established over the past thirty 
years. Macron, on the other hand, has achieved a victory that is explicitly and 
proudly centrist, giving him a mandate (or so he perceives it) to draw on 
specialists of the economics of the status quo, whether centre-left, centre-right or 
non-aligned, in order at last to make France the successful advanced capitalist 
society that will offer success at the top and trickle-down benefits all the way 
down to the bottom.  
 This familiar-sounding rhetoric and programme, I have argued, is in fact 
far from the substantial new departure it has been portrayed as being in much of 
the media, and has far more in common with the attempts at change by centre-
right and centre-left governments over the past few decades than its image 
would suggest. Certainly, the party-packaging is new, and a young, brilliant 
leader who is (apparently) morally beyond reproach is President. Moreover, the 
path to the Elysée Palace and the huge Assemblé nationale majority is strewn 
with the casualties of both the Hollande presidency and the election campaigns. 
The established centre parties of the Fifth Republic have taken a battering of 
historic proportions.  
 But, given the picture in other advanced capitalist countries, where 
tectonic shifts appear to be taking place in the way in which politics works – or 
rather where conventional politics no longer seems to work – it is likely that 
there is far more to this story. First, it is likely that, to borrow an expression from 
Wolfgang Streeck (2014), France is buying time. The attempts at change by 
various governments have been unsuccessful and neither business people, nor 
the unions, nor the unemployed, nor millions of ordinary voters are satisfied 
with the status quo, which Macron’s plans show little prospect of altering 
substantially. Macron and colleagues are, it would seem, delaying the moment 
when more drastic or substantial action will be sought by far more voters. At 
present, this is expressed by many in electoral terms by voting for the FN, and to 
some extent by voting for La France Insoumise and other, smaller alternative left 
parties. But one of the most overlooked aspects of the elections in 2017 has been 
the (in every sense) extraordinary volume of abstentions and in particular of 
spoiled ballots, expressions of protest in particular against being presented with 
the choice between Macron and Le Pen in the second round of the presidential 
elections. The sentiment behind these spoiled ballots seemed to be summed up 
by graffiti at the Place de la République in Paris written between the two rounds: 
‘Ni patrie ni patron. Ni Le Pen ni Macron.’ 
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